Fredi Gonzalez – One of Atlanta’s Best, Other Than Bobby (by AtlCrackersFan)

You may not think so now, but Fredi Gonzalez was one of the better managers in Braves history.

With history written daily, a first attempt at placing Fredi Gonzalez on the continuum of Braves managers reveals both the weaknesses of distorted sample sizes and the difficulty of measuring a manager’€™s contribution to a team’€™s record. For example, Gonzalez served as Atlanta’€™s 17th manager, the 10th who managed for at least a complete season. However Bobby Cox managed 24.560 of the 50 seasons since the team arrived in Atlanta.

Gonzalez stands a distant second on the Braves managerial roster, with just 5.228 seasons served as manager, 847 games managed, 434 wins, and 413 losses. By comparison, Cox’€™s two stints as manager totaled 24.599 seasons, 3,860 games, 2,466 victories and 1,713 losses.

Of the five Atlanta managers with a winning percentage, Gonzalez stands fourth behind Cox (.6392), Joe Torre (.5288), and Billy Hitchcock (.5238). Fredi (.5124) and Lum Harris (.5040) round out the top five.

Statistically, among all men who lasted a season or longer, the average Atlanta manager served for 4.834 seasons, 770 games and 434 wins. In reality, only two of the 10 qualifying managers exceed the average, Cox and Gonzalez. The median for the 10 qualifying managers provides a more realistic picture of Atlanta’€™s managerial experience: 2.201 seasons, 354 games and 151 victories.

Over the entire history of the Braves franchise, Gonzalez served as the 47th manager. His Braves record places him 8th in seasons managed, 6th in games and losses and 5th in victories. (19th- century skippers John Morrill and Harry Wright managed more seasons than Gonzalez, but many fewer games.)

Thirty-two of the franchise’€™s managers lasted for a season or longer. (Five of them managed but a single season.) The average for those 32: 4.194 seasons, 625 games and 323 wins. The median was 3.000 seasons, 453 games and 194 victories.

While these numbers provide a perspective of where Gonzalez resides on the roster of Braves managers, they do not provide a full picture of the dichotomy of his first four and one-half seasons and the last half season. After three seasons with 89, 94 and 96 wins, the 2014 Braves finished 79-83. As late as July 7, 2015, Atlanta’€™s record stood at 42-42. But over last 115 games Gonzalez managed, the Braves compiled an unbelievably bad 34-81 (.296) mark.

For the five complete seasons Gonzalez managed, the Braves exceeded their Pythagorean win-loss record by a +11 mark, including a remarkable +6 in 2015. In reviewing the rosters over the five seasons, the Braves lost Chipper Jones (retirement), Brian McCann (free agency), Jason Heyward (traded before a contract year) and Craig Kimbrel (trade). Gonzalez also dealt with the final year of Derek Lowe, the Dan Uggla and Melvin (BJ) Upton contracts and lack of commensurate performance, and Shelby Miller‘€™s dismal season.

Looking backwards, only Freddie Freeman (five seasons) and Jason Heyward (four seasons) provided any stability among the position players. On the pitching staff, Kimbrel’€™s four seasons and 185 saves provide the best example of stability. The decline of the Braves reveals itself more clearly in the pitching staff. The 2011 team overcame Derek Lowe‘€™s 9-17 mark, similar to Shelby Miller‘€™s 6-17 last season. In both 2011 and 2012, Tim Hudson led the team with 16 victories. The next three seasons, Julio Teheran was the team leader in victories, but a decreasing number: 15 in 2013, 14 in 2014 (tied with Ervin Santana) and 11 in 2015.

SeasonWinsPythagorean ∆ˆ†Position Starters WARTop 4 starters IPPlayers UsedPitchers UsedSaves Leader
201189414.3695.2452146
201294228.9671412142
201396-221740.1442150
201479116.4793392047
201567612.3642603724

For comparison’€™s sake, three other Division winning Braves€™ teams compiled the following comparables:

SeasonWinsPythagorean ∆Position Starters WARTop 4 starters IPPlayers UsedPitchers UsedSaves Leader
199696221.8865421839
198289420.3781.1391730
196993522.7948.1391827

As a side note, Phil Niekro led the Braves in victories and innings pitched in both 1969 and 1983, while Hank Aaron accounted for almost one-third of the starters WAR in 1969, with 8.0.

Perhaps Gonzalez didn’€™t manage as well as the team performed during his first four seasons, but shortly into the 2015 season the front office had obviously run out of pitching staff luck in identifying and signing good pitchers from the cast-off pile, unlike prior seasons when Santana and Pat Maholm provided the staff with innings and stability. Injuries to Brandon Beachy, Kris Medlen, Gavin Floyd and Mike Minor contributed.

While many criticize Gonzalez for varying reasons, including wearing out the bullpen, being overly conservative, not using the running game and not adjusting to the trend of repositioning players on defense, this overlooks the constantly changing roster from season to season.

By comparison, Cox had the luxury of three starters (Glavine, Maddux and Smoltz) eating innings year after year. Gonzalez averaged one starter per season pitching more than 200 innings. While Cox’€™s Braves roster changed every season, the rate of change didn’€™t equal that of the past five seasons, and the ‘€˜90s Braves didn’€™t have dead weight contracts like Lowe, Uggla and BJ Upton.

The last 115 games of Gonzalez’s tenure represent as bad a stretch as any Braves manager has encountered. (The 1909 and 1911 Boston teams posted .291 and .294 winning percentages for the season.) That said, in time, I think Fredi Gonzalez Braves tenure will be looked upon favorably when compared with other Braves managers not named Cox.

Note: The seasons managed calculation is the number of games managed divided by the number of games played. If Atlanta only plays 161 games in 2016, Gonzalez’s fractional season managed would increase slightly. The basic WAR data and Pythagorean Formula results came from Baseball-Reference.

70 thoughts on “Fredi Gonzalez – One of Atlanta’s Best, Other Than Bobby (by AtlCrackersFan)”

  1. Great post, Alex. Three (eventually four) HOFers definitely helped Bobby.

    On a separate note, this article contains a cool story about David Ross and Jason Heyward: “Epstein on Cubs’ Start: ‘This Is Not Baseball Reality'” http://teamstre.am/1TquE45

    My apologies if it’s been mentioned before.

  2. Atl Crackers Fan,

    In my time I would put Cox and Torre near the same level, then Luman Harris, then Fredi. That means Fredi was better than Eddie Matthews (or his shell), the dessicated corpse of Chuck Tanner, Russ Nixon, Ted Turner (on second thought???), and quite a few more characters of the Atlanta era.

  3. Atlanta Crackers Fan: what a great post! Even a numbers dunce such as I was able to follow and, maybe, understand. Thank you.

  4. @ 3 thanks for the kind words

    @2 I wouldn’t argue to loudly against your positioning of Harris and Gonzalez after Cox and Torre. If you look closely, I think Harris may have underperformed, but he was managing the last of the Milwaukee legacy without Milwaukee’s pitching staff.

    However, when considering Cox’s first stint with the Braves, an equally logical conclusion is when the roster consists of lemons, the manager will make lemonade.

  5. I continue to be amazed/perplexed/bewildered that we’re wasting time with long relief type guys like the Williams’ and Kelly instead of letting almost-ready prospects like Blair and Jenkins figure it out on the big stage.

  6. I take issue with the mention of “Shelby Miller’s dismal season”. Miller pitched very well last year. Atlanta’s offense was dismal, but Shelby was not.

  7. @5 It’s certainly possible that the Braves may let some of their more advanced pitching prospects take a shot at the MLB level for extended stretches of time once the Super 2 deadline passes – that said, Jenkins’ K/BB rate in AAA is awful, it really doesn’t look like he’s ready for MLB competition at all. Blair dominated AA and AAA (with decent-to-good K/BB rates) before getting smacked around in his first try in Atlanta.

    There are lots of other promising pitchers in the system but unfortunately, most of the big arms the Braves have acquired during the rebuild are still looking rough around the edges (as judged by BB/9 rate and WHIP), including Jenkins, Toussaint, Newcomb and Fried. Sims is also running a 1.55 WHIP at present. The most likely guys I see to get called up soon are Banuelos, Blair, Simmons and Gant – all of whom already have MLB service time.

  8. @5
    I continue to be amazed/perplexed/bewildered that so many people think that Jenkins is a future fixture in a competitive rotation, while the Bills are just chopped liver. Perez is only one year older than Jenkins and has had a far more effective pro track record. Jenkins hasn’t been all that great at AAA, despite a good ERA he’s WHIPping 1.444 and has a 3.9/5.6 bb/K. If Jenkins puts up a 1.086 WHIP and a 2.5/8.2 bb/k rate at AAA, then sure, promote him, but he hasn’t, that was Williams Perez.

  9. The fact that practically all of our pitching prospects continue to walk the park remains the most terrifying thing about the rebuild.

  10. @10
    Not all of them, just the ones who are widely perceived as having ACE ceilings. Plenty of guys with less pedigree who are viewed as middle or back end starters are putting up decent to good walk rates; Gant, Povse, Barker, Ellis, Whalen and so forth. All smart assery aside though, I share your concern that these boom or bust, high end pitching prospects, most of whom were big pieces in big trades, look more and more likely to bust. Obviously, the jury is still out on Folty, but seeing two great starts out of him went a long way in raising my hopes for some of these other flame throwers who have issues with command and efficiency.

  11. I think you gotta just keep graduating them as they approach their ceilings, not according to the height of that ceiling. If you want to pencil in your rotation in 2020 to be Sims, Newcomb, Allard, Fried and Soroka, you’ll hopefully have traded Perez, Blair, Jenkins and Gant as useful, if limited, major leaguers, instead of as 28 year old AAA rotation stalwarts.

    Besides, as fun as it would be to see the prospects that we hear the most about, it isn’t always the most highly touted guys who stick. One of those guys I listed as trade bait may take a step forward that a Sims or Newcomb never takes. Nobody has a birth right to a rotation spot.

  12. Sometimes I wonder if Williams Perez would be perceived differently if he had all the same stats but were 6’4″, 200 instead of 6’0″, 240.

  13. @13
    Along the same lines, people love to make fat jokes about him. I don’t see him as being that overweight. I don’t see a guy who is way out of shape here. He appears to me to be genetically predisposed to carrying more weight than the average pro athlete. He’s not the most exciting prospect we have for sure, but I hardly think he’s blocking more deserving candidates right now. Norris is pitching out of the pen and Chacin got traded. Blair got his shot and didn’t look ready. Perhaps Gant will get some looks as an actual starter. But I’m pretty sure that at this moment he is a better pitcher at the major league level than anybody at AAA. I’m all for letting these guys take their lumps in the majors while games don’t matter, but not before they’ve demonstrated some mastery of the minors.

  14. Also people seem to forget that Perez was awesome last season until he got hit in the shin (8 starts). Fredi made a questionable decision to leave him in the game and he got off kilter favoring the leg. He was awful when he got back off the DL, but this season he has been pretty good once again (a top-80 MLB pitcher in WAR despite only 6 starts).

    If he continues to pitch like this we have a solid back end starter or a legit trade chip. If he doesn’t, we have that information. If he languishes in AAA we have a low-ceiling question mark which is worthless.

  15. More importantly we just traded Brandon Barker. In the best possible light, our people knew barker’s early success was a fluke, and they reduced our pitching logjam while turning that fluke into the #76 pick

  16. Yeah, love trading Brandon Barker. This is a pretty safe vehicle to take him on.

  17. Cameron Maybin is 2-for-2 in today’s action. That makes him 14 for his last 22, if I’ve done my counting correctly. Throw in three walks while you’re at it. I really became a fan of this guy last year.

  18. Love trades like this. Added another top-80 pick and, perhaps more importantly, $838,900 in slot money. As Martin Gandy put it on Twitter, the Braves dealt their past two 16th-round picks and $3.9 million for a second-rounder in the upcoming draft — that’s a win.

  19. The Braves have $10,855,000 to spread across their first five picks. They’ll save a million or more on their first pick, which they’ll be able to spread across the rest of the draft, targeting tough signs. Gonna be fun to follow.

    And here’s hoping they’re not done making trades like this in advance of the draft.

  20. So Bowman says we will DFS Matusz. He is a left BP guy, why not try to get something out of him? I must be missing something there.

  21. It’s fascinating to see them stockpile draft picks. On Jonah Keri’s podcast, Coppolella talked a lot about the value of quantity in draft picks. It’s probably the single thing they’ve pursued most assiduously. I love selling high on Barker, too.

  22. Matusz must be hurt. He’s been relatively effective reliever for a few years and this team doesn’t just cut guys who used to be decent.

  23. Would we feel any better about the rebuild if, say, Norris, KJ, and Grilli were playing well and we were closer to a .500 team? After all, whether we won 75 or 45 games this year, it’s really all about how the young pitchers, Albies, Swanson, Ruiz, and the long-term members of the 25-man fare. Everyone else was meant to help towards short-term respectability.

    RE: Perez

    It is interesting to hear the discussions about how he’s perceived. For me, I’ve admittedly underrated him because of his size and lack of “status” as an elite prospect. But how long would he have to pitch well before he’s considered a long-term piece? I think also not getting him back in a trade (meaning he wasn’t part of the New Braves Order(TM) of pitching prospects) doesn’t help him in the fan reaction.

  24. If we were close to .500, I’d wonder if it was a rebuild. Frankly, I’m not saying we need to lose, but finishing 73-89 is about the worst thing this team could do, IMO. Either win/challenge or just go ahead and bottom out (as we are). At this point, I’ll secretly be a little disappointed if we don’t get the first pick in next year’s draft, LOL.

  25. If you read any of Bill Barnwell’s stuff on ESPN.com he consistently talks about what a crapshoot the NFL draft is, and that the teams that consistently draft well (New England and Baltimore) make it a priority to stockpile draft picks, NE trades down, and the Ravens tend to let their free agents leave to pick up compensatory picks.

    The gist is that you can’t KNOW how a player will perform at the highest level, so having a lot of picks gives you more chances to be right.

    I wonder if the Johns are pursuing that strategy? Sure seems like it.

  26. @34

    I’d say the MLB draft is about 5xs the crapshoot of the NFL draft.

    I also think you are in a better spot developing your own guys than picking them up. You know more about them and what they can’t do.

    The Cardinals have been the best in baseball, basically forever, at this.

  27. The other thing about Perez is he’s throwing the ball a little harder – roughly one mph harder on average, and touching the mid-90s. For a relatively unheralded guy like him, a velo bump is likely to increase his stock even more than pitching well.

  28. I know that FO can make a better projection than me on what Barker and Belicek’s upside was. I also know we have lots of pitchers. But to in effect pay 4 mill to be allowed to spend 900,000 more on the draft and get one more pick at pick 80 seems like a great overpay.

    The average value of a number 80 pick is less than 1 WAR. Are we relatively certain that neither Barker nor Belicek would produce 1 WAR? By pick 80 you are looking at guys who appear to have limits. Either, young and raw, or low ceiling, or injury history, or something.

    IF FO thought Matusz could be a #3 bullpen lefty with a chance (even if slim) at being better, then to me this makes sense. If they thought Matusz was pure DFA material, why go down this road? Was somebody else offering Orioles this kind of haul for that draft pick (two low ceiling lottery picks and real money)?

  29. Daniel Wright is starting for the Reds in his MLB debut. I am friends with his sister and use to toss ball with him.

  30. @38

    There is a lot we can do with the draft pick money wise. We now have more room to sign guys at different amounts over/under slot.

    We can also build better organizational depth. Barker and Belicek have very low upside and were 16th round picks. While they have pitched well, they probably don’t have the stuff to get big league hitters out consistently.

    Matusz can go to Gwinnett and maybe work on some stuff. If so, we can move him in a month or so.

  31. We also took AJ Minter with a pick in the 70s last year. He is off to a great start.

  32. @38

    If, as you claimed (and you could be right, I don’t know), the value of a mid-70’s pick is 1 WAR, then I think the Braves made out well – basically paying 3 million bucks, to acquire a 7 million dollar asset. (IF you buy the whole 1 WAR is valued at 7 million, that is.)

    Plus, we have a chance to see if a former top pick can be reclaimed. And, other than Adam Wainwright, what minor league pitchers have the Braves regretted trading in the past couple of decades?

  33. If the MLB draft is truly a crapshoot, there’d seem to be no value in tanking unless it allows a team to draft #1 and select an obvious Chipper/ Bryce franchise player, of which there are of course relatively few. Amassing lots of picks would be smart, but the difference between picking, say 5th and 15th would be minimal if any.

  34. I like the idea of taking on some bad 1 year contracts for top 100 picks. Lets grab a few more. If we can get 6 or 7 picks out of the top 100 surely some of those will pay off.

  35. I wonder how much difference an exciting second half (close to 500 ball with young players coming up and having a decent level of success) would make on ticket sales for this year, season ticket sales for next, and tv revenues going forward. My thought is that would be preferable to continuing to be the worst or second worst team in baseball. As noted, is there really that much difference between a number 5 and a number 15 pick?

  36. The new park means they don’t have to be competitive next year. Which is good timing, because we won’t be.

    But Swanson and Albies and more pitching will be called up by then, so at least there will be something to watch.

  37. @42,

    But SeatPainter, you haven’t accounted for any value on Barker or Belicek. Risks with prospects increase the farther they are away from MLB. Each level, they either prove something positive, meh out, or prove something negative. The odds are that Barker and Belicek together will produce more career WAR than “miscellaneous pick 80.” If the pick were higher, (in the first competitive balance group), I could agree, but pick 80 is slop.

    Also, I think you underestimate the cost. Braves are paying around 4 of Matusz’ contract plus actually have to spend the 900,000 plus (or something close to it) to get any use out of the pick. So, to “win” this trade (in light of DFA of Matusz) this is what has to happen.

    1. pick 80 produces more career WAR than Belicek and Barker combined.
    2. pick 80 has to start producing WAR in 4 years or else you have to discount it. Meaning a HS talent that moves slowly would produce his WAR later than B & B, thus it is less valuable, again.
    3. Pick 80 has to exceed B & B by .7 WAR to even the money
    UNLESS
    4. Matusz can be successfully controlled by him accepting an assignment to Gwinnett, rebuilding value, and either pitching in ATL or being dealt.

    To me it seems like a lot of “if”.

    This is one of those places where I join the “spend the money on this year’s team if you have 4 to 5 mill to blow and we wouldn’t be watching such crap” crowd.

  38. Yeah, I just think you’re looking at it the wrong way, cliff. They spent $3 million and traded away two borderline prospects for the ability to add $838,900 to their draft signing allotment and take another guy. That extra draft money is a good thing, not a bad thing.

    If Barker or Belicek turns into a useful major-leaguer, that will obviously change the backward-looking calculus, but one of the things the Braves have done, as alluded to above, is given themselves another opportunity to pay for a top-20-caliber pick with that 40th pick.

    To wit: Belicek was a senior taken in the 16th round last year who very likely signed for $10K or less. They could just get this year’s Belicek if they want at #76, and they could then spend #18-slot-type money ($2,441,600) on the guy they take at #40 ($1,616,800 slot).

    Adding the million or more they’re likely to save at #3 to the #44 pick ($1,459,700 slot) gives them another shot at a top-20 talent, too.

    There are obviously several different permutations here, but the point is that they’ve given themselves a great deal of draft ammunition — it’s not just that they’re adding the 76th-best player in the draft.

    As I said last night, I hope they keep finding willing partners for deals like this.

  39. It’s very possible, as Stu noted, that the cash associated with the pick 80 slot is even more important than the pick itself. The Braves are calculating that the talent available in the 2016 June draft is such that having a number of high picks, with the cash flexibility to sign a lot of them, is likely to bring a great deal of valuable talent in the system.

    In Coppy’s podcast with Jonah Keri, which you can listen to here, he mentions the New York Yankees’ 2006 draft as one of the best ever. This was a striking comment, because it gives some insight into his draft philosophy. Coppolella was with the Yankees then, as was Gordon Blakeley, whom the Braves hired in 2014.

    So, in 2006, the Yankees’ first pick was 21st overall. Being the Yankees, they had to get used to drafting low. However, they drafted major leaguers with more than half of their first 20 picks, including:
    Round 1: Ian Kennedy
    Round 1 (supplemental): Joba Chamberlain
    Round 3: Zach McAllister (a good Indians middle reliever)
    Round 5: George Kontos (a good Giants lefty specialist)
    Round 8: Dellin Betances
    Round 9: Mark Melancon
    Round 17: David Robertson

    None of those guys is going into the Hall of Fame. But a lot of them are valuable roster role players, and Kennedy won 20 games in 2011 and received Cy Young votes.

    Now, the criticism of this approach is clear: by picking that 2006 draft as his model, it might seem like he’s thinking like receiving a bunch of relievers is an optimal outcome, when what you really want is average and above-average starting players. But there is pretty much no way other than the draft to receive this great of an infusion of talent.

    They’re also calculating, of course, that Barker and Belicek are at the height of their value. Presumably, the Braves’ scouts have been telling them that though these guys are playing well right now, they’re not future stars. That’s Keith Law’s opinion, too:

  40. cliff,

    I certainly get that Barker and Belicek COULD produce greater WAR totals than the 76 pick, but as two 16th round picks (albeit, ones that have shown some success) I’m not overly worried that we’re going to regret losing them. The question becomes, does the player we get at 76 produce more than the two players we gave away. And, since TINSTAAPP – I’m OK with the toss of the dice the FO has made in this situation. I think a 3rd rounder (which is basically what pick 76 is – mid third) will consistently outproduce two 16th rounders. Then, you take the difference between the WAR totals, and the Braves have basically paid three million dollars for that difference.

    It may not in this one particular instance, but I think, all things being equal, this is the type of risk a good front office will take every day and twice on Sunday.

  41. It isn’t the 76th pick alone. It’s 840k to spend. The entire idea is that a larger draft pool allows us flexibility to go over slot and secure a player before the draft.

    No one expects the top 5 players to demand full slot. The Braves hope to save $1m or more on the #3 pick. Now with picks 76 and 80, you can make a reach on one or both of those picks for a player no one else is on, save money there, and suddenly you have early first round money to spend on pick 40, 44, of both, allowing you to improve the quality of player you take there. Even more importantly, the Braves can say to the kids they are looking at for those slots “we want to make you a top 100 pick” (to the 76 and 80 picks) and to the 40 and 44 picks “we’re going overslot for you if you can arrange to be around in the second round.”

    Adding almost $1m to a draft budget of $12m offers huge flexibility, in addition to the 1 extra top 80 player you get to acquire.

    That the value is debatable on its face, without considering the implications for the other picks, just shows how good a move this is.

  42. Finer point: $7 mil per WAR is the price on the open free agent market, which the Braves almost never pay. If teams actually had to pay $7 million for each win above a replacement roster, it would cost around $250 million to field a .500 team.

    It’s not quite so simple, then, as to plug any expected value acquisition of 1 WAR into that equation to call it a win or a loss.

    It might make more sense to say that if the Braves expect to win 90 games, they’re going to have to do it for about 3.5 million per WAR (I have maths to come up with this but don’t want to bore), so that number is about the break-even point.

  43. There’s no doubt that more picks is better. Keep drafting Sean Gilmartins and Jason Hurshs and it won’t matter much. I think the sea change here is mainly in player-profile / selection process. If we’re back to high-risk / high-reward HS players then we need more picks to compensate for the risk.

  44. You can grab an Alex Wood or Andrelton Simmons with that kind of pick, and then trade them for nothing…if you so chose.

  45. I think you guys are overlooking the immense fireworks savings from the Braves lack of HR at home this year. Only 6 hit at home all year (and only 4 by current Braves, all Freeman). Really could be huge budget-wise.

  46. I forgot that Matusz was, at this point, a failed reliever. At a quick glance, I initially thought that we had traded for the Matusz of 4 years ago (a good left-handed starter), and thought that we had developed and leveraged two starting pitching prospects at the height of their value to get someone that could help at the major league level. As I took an extra second to realize what we were doing, I started to wonder that if we keep doubling down on risky, long-term talent, could Coppy run out of string? Let’s say this first wave of pitching prospects don’t work out, and we lose 100 games next year. Could the fanbase become even more impatient, and Coppy becomes the 2017 Fredi? I wonder if Coppy may end up not being around for the finished product. Could the narrative shift from “Coppy is building up a winner for years to come” to “Coppy made a bunch of bad trades and can’t produce a major league roster”?

  47. Atlanta is probably the best market in pro sports to try something like this. There’s zero media pressure, and the fanbase is going to show up to ride the mechanical bull next year even if we lose 100 games.

    Revenue declines are surely factored in to the rebuild (one would think)…hell, they may even be a good thing for Liberty in the short-run, who knows.

  48. 64—I’m sure there’s a breaking point (although it will not be in 2017), but how is this trade any kind of doubling down? I guess they could have spent that $3 million on a competent platoon outfielder or something?

    It’s not like this was a Simmons-for-Newcomb situation. $3 million and a couple of 16th-rounders for a second-rounder/$840K of additional draft funds isn’t extending the competitive timeline any.

    (New thread, BTW.)

  49. Why was Mateuz DFA’d ? Does he have to clear waivers to be assigned to the minors?

  50. @64 Chicago was patient with Epstein because he had a plan but it also took what, four years? Yes, they were mostly crap before that as well but anyway. I think they will and I think they should give Coppy enough time. I like what he’s doing. It is unconventional and I have to say I really dig it. It might take until 2019 until we are ready to make a serious run, but I really enjoy to watch what is being built right now. I think they should be very patient with Coppy. I like him.

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